This position paper presents our approach for deployment enforcement of virtual images (VM), in order to prevent an unauthorized usage, potential insider threat, and theft of VMs. In existing systems, regular images in a virtual environment can be mounted and installed in a different location, while our system prevents the intentional and unintentional roaming of these images, triggered by either humans or automation tools. This paper proposes an approach that secures installation location according to policy in virtualized environments, by intercepting the image installation process.
INTRODUCTION
In the domain of cloud virtualization (Gurav and Shaikh, 2010) , virtual machines (VM) and configured appliances are used to drive the dynamic capacity of the infrastructure, facilitate configuration, and enable the elasticity of roaming systems that lever the abstraction of the physical location. This abstraction enables VMs to be active in one virtual environment, suspended, and then roamed to another virtual environment where they can resume the exact state. When the VM is moved, it is handled as a regular file. These roaming capabilities enable capacity bursting as well as improved performance in terms of energy or physical CPU utilization. Such value propositions created by the VM abstraction of the physical server layers introduce new security vulnerabilities (Blum et al., 2011; Heiser and Nicolett, 2008; Kresimir and Zeljko, 2010) , such as: (1) the ability of nonprivileged administrators to access data and the VM when the image is in dormant state; (2) theft of the VM by copying and activating it in a non-approved environment; (3) the ability to disrupt compliance and privacy (Pearson, 2009 ) regulations unintentionally by activating the image (VM) in a non-monitored environment.
This position paper proposes an approach that precludes these virtual environment security vulnerabilities (Lombardi and Pietro, 2011; Mather et al., 2009 ) using a self-aware security deployment enforcement system. The enforcement policy is aimed primarily at the prevention of theft or unauthorized roaming of virtualized and cloud-based images. Moreover, this paper suggests a combination of a centralized enforcement approach, and the VM self-aware security capabilities of deployable image.
The proposed system addresses several security vulnerabilities and challenges:
• Prevention of theft of images.
• Governing the compliance of an authorized deployment within the enterprise boundaries.
• Rapid feedback in the case of suspected nonauthorized deployment.
• Indication of and alerts of a potential insider threat.
• Optional self-protection and self-destruction of the data and image upon detection of nonauthorized usage.
• Increased efficiency of deployment of approved images, which expedites the synchronization of the latest policies based on level of importance. Namely, separation of deployment enforcement from other policies for privileged users that are updated based on the normal security process.
• The ability to certify secured locations for images to be deployed centrally, while, however, enforcing the actual deployment on a standalone, self-aware mechanism. • Enabling a real-time prevention and visibility into the deployed image.
CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE
The proposed system extends existing Privileged Access Management solutions, with additional security enforcement capabilities. These capabilities relate to deployment and installation of VM on top of virtualized, such as VMware, or hosted, such as on Amazon EC2, environments. This section describes the fundamental components relevant to this position paper. Yet, it extends a basic use case of Privileged Access Management for centralized security control. The basic use case provides a centralized definition of security policies according to compliance, regulation, or any other security need of the enterprise. The centralized system sends security policies to security agents that are deployed on the managed servers (VMs or physical servers). The agents interpret every administrator command, and either permit or deny the execution of that command, with appropriate reporting and auditing. 
System Structure

Prototypical Scenarios
In order to exemplify the conceptual architecture, several scenarios (use cases) are presented.
Activation Scenario -Theft Prevention
Every time an administrator tries to load a guest VM on the Virtualization Product, 
Prototypical Implementation
Figure 2 describes the implementation of our solution in a VMware environment that has several virtualization products, such as VMware ESXi. The ESXi virtualization product can run many VMs on it, such as Windows and Linux VMs. The system administrator installs Deployment Enforcer Agents on these VM. The administrator deploys Virtual Appliance VM with the Deployment Enforcer Monitor on the ESXi virtualization product system. 
Use Case 1: Theft Prevention
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This position paper addresses security vulnerability issues in virtualized cloud environments, where the scale-up, bursting scenario of virtual images (VM) is common. In such environments, an IT management service should provide an agile response: the deployment of a VM by the centralized managing tool, supporting rapid security responses. In these virtual environments, the VM can be stored in a managed repository, or extracted and installed in different unauthorized location, exposing it to intentional theft of data. The presented approach offers a way to separate the deployment security needs from other security needs in order to increase efficiency of deployed images that are controlled in terms of location only. Furthermore, when a VM is mounted in an external or un-authorized virtualization environment, the system prevents the installment of the protected image, thus, preventing theft or insider threat.
As a result, the presented system prevents the intentional and unintentional deployment and consequent activation of a virtual image. Our approach secures the enterprise's recommended prebuilt VMs that cannot be accessed except with the approval and verification of the organization policy. Consequently, our solution addresses a new form of security vulnerability in the virtualization domain according to compliance and regulations needs.
